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Abstract 
This   article   explores   Paul   Ricœur’s   early   writings   in   the   1930s   on   Christian   philosophy.      It   seeks   to  
contextualize   both   his   published   and   unpublished   works   from   that   period   within   the   robust   historical,  
philosophical  and  theological  debates  in  Paris  between  the  leading  intellectuals  of  the  time:  Bréhier,  Gilson,  
Blondel,  Brunschvicg,  Marcel,  Maury,  de  Lubac,  and  Barth.    The  article  proceeds  to  examine  Ricœur’s  own  
position  within  these  debates.    
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Résumé 
Cet  article  explore  les  premiers  écrits  de  Paul  Ricœur  des  années  1930  sur  la  philosophie  chrétienne.  Il  tente  
de   contextualiser   à   la   fois   ses   travaux   publiés   et   les   inédits,   dans   une   période,   à   Paris,  marquée   par   des  
débats  d'ʹenvergure  sur   le  plan  historiographique,  philosophique  et   théologique,  débats  qui  ont  engagé  de  
grands  intellectuels  de  l'ʹépoque:  Bréhier,  Gilson,  Blondel,  Brunschvicg,  Marcel,  Maury,  de  Lubac,  ainsi  que  
Barth.  L'ʹarticle  se  poursuit  pour  examiner  la  position  propre  de  Ricœur  dans  ces  débats.    
Mots-­‐‑clés:    Philosophie  chrétienne,  Raison,  Foi,  Immanence,  Transcendance  
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Introduction  
It   is   often   noted   that   Ricœur   sought   to   separate   his   philosophical   writings   from   his  
theological  writings.     Perhaps  nowhere   is   this  dual  program  more  explicitly  enunciated  than   in  
Soi-­‐‑même   comme   un   autre,   which,   in   his   words,   pursues   an   “autonomous   philosophical  
discourse.”1   It  is  well-­‐‑known  that  the  original  Gifford  Lectures  included  two  studies  on  biblical  
hermeneutics   so   as   to   remain   faithful   to   the   founder’s   will   for   the   lectures   to   be   on   ‘natural  
theology.”2   They  were  removed,  however,  from  Soi-­‐‑même  comme  un  autre  to  remain  faithful  to  the  
separation  of  philosophy  and  theology  that  Ricœur  maintained  throughout  his  life.3    Despite  his  
claims  to  ‘conceptual  asceticism,’  recent  works  in  Ricœur  studies  attest  that  his  thought  continues  
to  resonate  and  appeal  within  philosophy  of  religion  and  theology.4    Surely,  part  of  the  reason  for  
the  continued  fascination  with  his  work  is  that  it  accesses  and  illuminates  the  frontiers  and  limits  
of  philosophy   from  multiple  approaches,  perspectives,  and  disciplines.     But  part  of   the   interest  
can  be  attributable  to  counter-­‐‑claims  that  Ricœur  himself  makes,  particularly  towards  the  end  of  
his  career,  that  complicate  and  nuance  his  own  purported  conceptual  asceticism.5     
This  article  does  not  attempt  a  global  or  comprehensive  resolution  to  Ricœur’s  reflections  
on   the   relationship   between   philosophy   and   theology,   for   it   seems   to   me   that   his   own  
understanding  on  the  issue  was  always  provisional  and  developed  over  time.    Instead,  my  aims  
are  much  more  limited  and  modest  by  focusing  on  his  early  writings  in  the  1930s  on  “Christian  
philosophy.”    His  works  during  this  period  are  often  either  neglected  altogether  or  referred  to  as  
the   years   when   he   engaged   social   Christianity.6      But   in   my   judgment,   they   merit   closer  
examination  for  a  couple  of   important  reasons.     Firstly,  his  published  article,  entitled  “Note  sur  
les   rapports  de   la  philosophe  et  du  christianisme”   (1936),  was  his  distinct   contribution   to  what  
was  the  intellectual  debate  in  Paris  in  the  early  to  mid-­‐‑1930s.7    The  issue  regarding  the  status  and  
meaning  of  Christian  philosophy  engaged  the  leading  historians,  philosophers  and  theologians  of  
the   time:   Émile   Bréhier,   Étienne  Gilson,  Maurice   Blondel,   Léon   Brunschvicg,   Jacques  Maritain,  
Gabriel  Marcel,  Auguste  Lecerf,  Pierre  Maury,  and  Henri  de  Lubac.     Moreover,  the  debate  took  
on  additional  vigor  with  Karl  Barth’s  first  visit  to  Paris  in  1934  when  he  lectured  in  front  of  many  
of   these   French   luminaries.      An   examination   of   Ricœur’s   reflections   on   Christian   philosophy,  
then,   sheds   light  on   the   important  debates  and  broader  context  of  his   thought  during  his  early  
formative  years.    Secondly,  and  more  germane  to  current  Ricœur  studies,  his  public  intervention  
and  private  writings  during  this  period  offer  the  first  glimpse  of  his  critical  reception  of  Barth  and  
his   first   tentative   formulation  on   the   relationship  between  philosophy  and  Christianity.     While  
there  are  now  a  number  of  excellent  studies  that  rightly  note  the  deep  resonances  and  affinities  
between  Ricœur  and  Barth   for   the  purposes  of   building  up  a   constructive   understanding  of   the  
nature  and   task  of   theology,8   a   close  examination  of   the  historical   reception  of  Barth  by  Ricœur  
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remains   absent   from   the   current   literature.      This   article   seeks   to   address   this   gap   by  
contextualizing  the  Paris  debates  over  the  status  and  meaning  of  Christian  philosophy  during  the  
1930s  and  by  examining  Ricœur’s  own  position  on  the  issue  with  primary  attention  to  the  early  
published  article   in  consultation  with  his  unpublished  thesis  and  his  personal  notes  taken  from  
the  period.      
The  Paris  Debate    
Debates  on  the  nature  and  task  of  Christian  philosophy  can  be  traced  as  far  back  to  the  
origins  of  Christianity  itself.     But  that  abiding  issue  was  renewed  and  reinvigorated  in  the  early  
1930s   in  Paris,  drawing  responses  from  leading  historians,  philosophers,  and  theologians  of   the  
day.    Initially,  the  debate  was  between  the  two  leading  intellectual  historians  of  the  day  –  Émile  
Bréhier  and  Étienne  Gilson  -­‐‑  who  both  wrote  influential  works  on  the  history  of  philosophy,  but  
disagreed   about   the   very   nature   and   meaning   of   philosophy   itself.      Bréhier’s   ambitious,  
sweeping,   three-­‐‑volume   work,   Histoire   de   la   philosophie,9   not   only   traced   the   history   and  
development  of  Western  thought,  but  also  sought  to  show  the  methodological  independence  and  
integrity   of   the   history   of   philosophy   in   relation   to   the   history   of   other   disciplines.      From   an  
historical   approach,   then,   Bréhier   argued   that   there   was   no   Christian   philosophy   because  
Christianity  did  not  substantially  influence  the  development  of  philosophical  thought.    The  scope  
of   his   work   is   truly   vast,   but   the   significance   of   this   point   was   not   lost   on   others   as   it   drew  
responses   from  many,   including  Gilson.     At   a   fateful   session   on  March   21,   1931   at   the   Société  
française  de  philosophie,10 Gilson,  who  was  then  in  the  course  of  preparing  his  Gifford  Lectures  
on   the   essence   of   the   spirit   of  medieval   philosophy,   offered   a   counter-­‐‑argument,   precisely   on  
historical   grounds,   that  Christianity   transformed   the  nature   of   philosophy   itself.11     Aquinas,   to  
take   just   one   example,   transformed   Aristotelian   thought   in   a   way   that   inexorably   altered  
philosophical  notions  such  as  the  idea  of  creation,  the  idea  of  the  person,  and  so  on.  
In  the  eyes  of  many  at  the  time,  Gilson  won  the  debate  regarding  the  historical  question  
as  to  whether  there  exists  a  Christian  philosophy.    As  Henri  de  Lubac  observed:  “As  quickly  as  he  
arrived,  Mr.  Bréhier   found  himself   nearly   forgotten   and   the  defenders   of  Christian  philosophy  
were  busier  discussing  amongst  themselves  on  their  respective  conceptions.”12    What  began  as  a  
narrow   dispute   within   medieval   intellectual   history,   then,   took   on   broader   significance.      No  
longer   was   the   debate   about   whether   Christian   philosophy   exists,   but   rather   what   its   precise  
nature  was.     Brunschvicg,   for   instance,   argued   that  while   a  philosopher  may  be  Christian,   it   is  
only   accidental   in   the   same   manner   in   which   there   may   be   a   Christian   who   writes   on  
mathematics  or  medicine.    Maritain,  to  take  another  example,  distinguished  between  the  essence  
and  state  of  philosophy  such  that  while  philosophy  always  uses  natural  reason,   its  condition  of  
exercise   has   changed.      Blondel   went   further   by   arguing   that   if   philosophy   wants   to   insist   on  
rationality,  it  must  also  acknowledge  its  incomplete  character,  and  that  religion  shows  itself  in  the  
extension  of  philosophy.     All  the  eminent  philosophers  of  the  day,   it  seemed,  were  weighing  in  
on  the  debate.      
Given  the  context  and  contestation  over   the  very  meaning  of  Christian  philosophy,  one  
can  imagine  the  anticipation  and  stir  that  Karl  Barth’s  first  visit  to  Paris  in  April  1934  must  have  
created.      His   reputation   had,   in   fact,   preceded   him   due   in   large   part   to   the   work   of   Pierre  
Maury,13 who   spread   the   new   insights   of   his   thought   to   the   French   context   by   publishing   his  
articles14   and   translating   his   writings.15    Indeed,   Maury   presented   some   of   Barth’s   ideas   on  
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Representing  what   are   now   familiar,   but  what  must   have   been   provocative   ideas   at   the   time,  
Maury  explains  that  Barth  unapologetically  refuses  to  elaborate  a  Christian  philosophy  as  there  is  
no  point  of  contact  outside  of  what  God  establishes.    “It  is  impossible  to  define  philosophically  the  
unifying  principle  of  the  thought  of  Karl  Barth,”  Maury  began  the  session,  “because  his  thought  
does  not  want  to  be  philosophical,  but  rather  theological.”17     
This  is  all  to  say  that  when  Barth  visited  Paris  in  1934,  it  was  with  much  excitement  and  
anticipation.    Gilson  had  just  taught  a  course  at  the  Collège  de  France  on  Anselm  that  ended  with  
a   critical  discussion  of   the   interpretation  proposed  by  Barth.18   Yves  Congar,   the  great  Catholic  
thinker,  prepared  a  course  specifically  on  Barth  in  anticipation  of  his  visit.19   He  would  recall  later  
that  Barth’s  three  lectures  at  the  Sorbonne,20  his  lectures  at  the  Faculté  protestante  de  théologie,21  
and  his  lunchtime  discussion  at  Juvisy  would  be  attended  by  luminaries  such  as  Gilson,  Maritain,  
Marcel,  and  Maury  amongst  others.    If  Maury  prepared  the  French  audience  for  his  provocative  
ideas,  Barth  did  not  disappoint.    As  Bernard  Reymond  states  of  his  Sorbonne  lectures,  “From  the  
first   page,   one   experiences   the   very   clear   sense   of   finding   oneself   in   a   combative   discourse,  
sometimes   a   bit   provocative,   destined   to   arouse   reactions.”22    In   his   first   lecture,   for   instance,  
Barth  insists  that  revelation  is  not  submitted  to  philosophical  reflection  into  the  conditions  for  its  
possibility,  but  rather   it   is  given  freely  as  the  divine  sovereign  act  of  God.23   Theology,   then,  he  
proceeded  to  argue,  does  not  require  philosophy  to  justify  or  ground  its  existence  since  revelation  
itself   is   authoritative.      Barth’s   rejection   of   the   notion   of   Christian   philosophy   would   be  
underlined   particularly   in   his   third   lecture   that   addressed   theology.      “Is   there   nothing   more  
regrettable,”  he  rhetorically  asks  in  that  lecture,  “than  the  attempt,  developed  over  the  centuries,  
to   determine   a   systematic   link   or,   conversely,   a   systematic   distinction   between   the   domain   of  
theology  and  that  of  philosophy?.   .   .   It   is  evident   that   theology  can  only  become  interesting  for  
philosophy  from  the  instant  where  it  renounces  interest  in  it.”24         
What   began   as   a   narrow   debate   within   intellectual   history   became   a   much   broader  
conversation  about   the  possibility  and  nature  of  Christian  philosophy  that  engaged  the   leading  
thinkers  of  the  time.    By  1936,  only  five  years  after  that  fateful  session  with  Gilson  at  the  Société  
française   de   philosophie,   it   seemed   that   every   major   significant   figure   in   French   thought  
contributed   to   that   debate   so   that  Henri   de   Lubac  would  write,   “Is   it   a   bit   late   to   speak   of   it  
again?   .   .   .   For   roughly   five   years,   everyone   was   required   to   respond:   Is   there   a   Christian  
philosophy?    And  in  which  sense?    And  to  which  conditions?”25   
Ricœur’s  Private  Reflections  and  Public  Intervention  into  the  Paris  Debate    
When   Ricœur   published   his   article,   “Note   sur   les   rapports   de   la   philosophie   et   du  
christianisme”  in  1936,  he  was  perhaps  a  little  late  to  the  public  debate  in  Paris,  but  it  was,  in  fact,  
a  subject  on  which  he  had  reflected  for  a  number  of  years.    His  dissertation,  which  he  submitted  
in   1934   entitled  Méthode   réflexive   appliquée   au   problème   de  Dieu   chez   Lachelier   et   Lagneau,   already  
gave   the   first   indications  of  his   critique  of   the  doctrine  of   immanence   in   reflexive  philosophies  
and   his   proposal   for   a   Christian   doctrine   of   transcendence.      On   the   one   hand,   Lachelier   and  
Lagneau   were   both   right,   according   to   Ricœur,   to   make   God   the   central   idea   in   reflexive  
method.26   But  he  argues  that  such  philosophies  remain  incomplete  if  they  depart  from  and  return  
to   thought,   reducing  God   to   the  All  of  human   thought  within  a  doctrine  of   immanence.27   The  
reflexive   method   then   requires   a   consideration   of   a   philosophy   of   faith;   beyond   the   God   of  
philosophers   and   beyond   doctrines   of   immanentism,   the   philosopher   needs   to   consider   the  
transcendent   and   living   God   of   the   Christian   tradition.28    Such   a   doctrine   of   transcendence,  
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Ricœur   suggests,  does  not  oppose  and  contradict   a  doctrine  of   immanence,  but   rather  deepens  
and   further   interiorizes   it.29   As  he   states   in   the   final  words  of   the  précis   that  he  handed   to  his  
thesis  committee,  quoting  Blondel:  “To  move  us  to  ourselves,  we  have  to  exit  from  us  before  re-­‐‑
entering.”30    Ricœur’s  thesis  indicates  his  first  attempts  to  probe  the  limits  of  a  broadened  method  
and  understanding  of  reflexive  philosophy,  one  critical  of   the  regnant   idealisms  of   the  day  and  
more   open   and   friendly   to   Christian   philosophy.      For   whatever   reason,   his   thesis   was   never  
published,  and  so  the  remainder  of  this  article  will  focus  on  the  article  that  Ricœur  did  publish  in  
1936,   “Note   sur   les   rapports   de   la   philosophie   et   du   christianisme.”      Not   only   does   it   signal  
further   reflections  on  Christian  philosophy,  but   it  also   indicates  his   first   reflections  on  Barthian  
theology  to  which  he  was  introduced  during  the  interim  period.      
Ricœur  begins  the  article  by  stating  that  theologians  often  condemn  philosophy,  and  that  
he   seeks   to   investigate   the   reasons  underlying   the  Christian   critique  of  philosophy,   on   the  one  
hand,  and  then   to  explore   the  Christian  status  of  philosophy,  properly  understood.      In   the   first  
part  of   the  article,   then,  which  deals  with   the  critique  of  philosophies,  he  divides   them  broadly  
into   two   major   camps:   spiritualists   and   materialists.      Because   there   is   a   large   gap   and   little  
interest  for  rapprochement  between  Christianity  and  materialists,  he  focuses  his  attention  on  two  
distinct   and   representative   strands   in   spiritualist   philosophy:   Brunschvicg’s   rationalism   and  
Bergson’s   mysticism.      Brunschvicg   propounds   a   “philosophy   of   spirit”   that   emphasizes   the  
intellectual  effort  of  man  to  constitute  knowledge  and  action.    Each  of  these  terms  is  important  on  
Ricœur’s   reading   of   Brunschvicg,   and   so   he   takes   some   time   explaining   the   meaning   and  
significance   of   each.      By   “effort,”   Ricœur   notes   that   Brunschvicg   underlines   that   spirit   is  
movement   in   history   that   marks   intellectual   progress.31      By   “intellectual,”   Brunschvicg  
emphasizes   that   effort   culminates   in   clear   judgment   and   understanding   common   to   all  
individuals,  where   the   ideal   form  of   reason   is  mathematics.     Within   this   intellectualist   schema,  
then,  Christianity   is   a  dream   for   satisfaction   that   is   incompatible  with  pure   spiritualism  and   is  
viewed   as   regression   to   the   inferior   status   of   a   myth.      “All   effort   to   surpass   the   clarity   of  
mathematics,”  so  goes  the  argument,  “only  succeeds   in  bringing  us  back  to  the   inferior   level  of  
vital   instinct,   infantilism,   and   collective  myths.”32    Reason,   far   from   subordinating   itself   to   the  
mystery  of  faith  and  acknowledging  the  internal  contradiction  of  sin,  seeks  to  move  beyond  it.33   
The   effort  within   man   strives   to   move   beyond   the   ‘material   force’   of   determinate   religions   to  
freedom  in  spiritual  and  intellectual  life.    The  true  essence  of  religion,  on  this  account,  is  nothing  
other  than  pure  absolute  spirit,  and  the  final  site  of  revelation  is  man.    In  a  statement  that  echoes  
his   critiques  of  Lachelier  and  Lagneau,  Ricœur  states  of  Brunschvicg’s   idealism:  “But   this  God,  
who  is  neither  separated,  nor  personal,  nor  conscious  of  itself,  nor  mysterious,  nor  revealed,  what  
is  it  then?    The  idea  of  unity,  the  copula  of  judgment,  the  bare  power  of  thought…man  himself.”34   
Brunschvicg’s    philosophy  –  its  supreme  confidence  in  human  powers  of  reason  and  its  pride  in  
overcoming  mystery  and  paradox  –   is,  on  Ricœur’s  account,   incompatible  with  and  contrary   to  
Christian  faith.      
Next,   Ricœur   turns   his   attention   to   Bergson’s   philosophy   of  mysticism.     While  Ricœur  
acknowledges   that   Bergson   is   right   to   defend  mysticism   against   a   narrow   rationalism,   he   also  
empties   it   of   any   historical,   dogmatic,   and   liturgical   elements:   “The   profound   opinion   of  
Bergson,”  Ricœur  writes,  “is   that   theological   language  and  the   images  of  piety  are  a  contingent  
form,  an  impure  matrix  in  which  mysticism  can  and  must  be  liberated.”35    Whatever  differences  
exist   between   the   rationalism   of   Brunschvicg   and   the  mysticism   of   Bergson,   Ricœur   finds   that  
both   attempt   to   move   beyond   historical   Christianity   in   all   its   mystery   and   paradox.36    In  
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when  the  philosopher  searches  for  any  process  to  attenuate  this  scandal,  to  mask  this  paradox,  to  
re-­‐‑absorb  the  revealed  given  in  a  dialectic  of  reason  or  spirit,  in  this  precise  measure,  he  ceases  to  
be  a  Christian  philosopher.”37    To  this  point  in  the  article,  Ricœur  offers  a  strong  and  bold  critique  
of   the  contemporary  philosophies  of  Brunschvicg  and  Bergson  that  reaffirm  and  recapitulate   in  
many   ways   his   earlier   critique   of   the   19th   century   philosophies   of   Lachelier   and   Lagneau.    
Philosophy   remains   incomplete   and   inadequate   if   it   reduces   the   All   to   human   effort  within   a  
doctrine  of  immanence  and  fails  to  consider  Christian  faith  in  all  its  paradox  and  mystery.      
If  Ricœur  offers  firm  critiques  of  the  major  strands  in  contemporary  French  philosophy,  
born   from   years   working   and   reflecting   on   his   thesis,   his   positive   proposal   for   the   status   of  
philosophy  within  Christianity  remains  more  tentative  and  searching,  trying  to  grapple  with  the  
new   insights   of   Barth.      One   model   for   Christian   philosophy   is   what   he   calls   a   “synthesis”  
between  philosophy  and  Christianity.    The  term  is  perhaps  misleading  because  he  does  not  mean  
by  it  the  enfolding  of  the  mysteries  of  Christian  faith  into  a  higher  form  of  rationalist  philosophy  
as   Brunschvicg   suggested,   but   rather   he   simply   seeks   “to   link   the   common   problems   of  
philosophy  to  the  teachings  of  faith.”38   But  insofar  as  the  two  disciplines  share  common  problems,  
the  synthesis  would  be  subjected  strictly  to  the  rational  or  natural  criteria  of  philosophy.    On  the  
one  hand,  Ricœur  finds  such  a  conception  of  Christian  philosophy  to  be  legitimate  because  it   is  
delimited   to   its   proper   purview,   but,   on   the   other   hand,   it   is   restricted   to   a   narrow   form   of  
rationality   that   is   to  be   surpassed.     Regarding  both   the   legitimacy  and   limitation  of  a   synthetic  
understanding  of  Christian  philosophy,  Ricœur  quotes  Maury  in  a  footnote  in  the  article:  “To  the  
extent  where  it  is  not  usurped,  it  is  not  only  legitimate,  but  commanded.    We  have  something  to  
do   on   earth,   for  which   God   has   placed   us.      One  must   only   recognize   that   all   science,   like   all  
human   activity,   tends   almost   necessarily   to   be   usurped.”39      The   reference   to   Maury   –   and  
indirectly   to   Barth   –   is   significant   because   Ricœur   seems   to   tacitly   affirm   the   validity   of  
philosophy  that  is  freed  up  not  in  spite  of  Christian  faith,  but  precisely  because  of  it.      
Christian  philosophy,  however,  runs  into  problems  when  it  attempts  to  extend  the  limits  
of   reason   by   employing   an   apologetic   method   that   approaches   faith   by   natural   and   human  
means,   for   disagreements   arise   on   the   issue   of   whether   one   can   speak   of   God   outside   of  
revelation.     Ricœur  proceeds   to  delineate   two  poles  on   this   issue.     At  one  end  of   the  spectrum,  
there   is   Thomism,  which  Ricœur   characterizes   as   a   form   of   natural   theology   that   prepares   the  
way  or  serves  as  a   foundation  for  revelation.40      Interestingly,  his  private  notes   from  this  period  
reveal   a   much   more   sophistictated   understanding   of   Thomism.41      Indeed,   this   more   nuanced  
interpretation  finds  its  way  in  a  footnote  in  the  article  when  he  writes,  “absolutely  speaking,  this  
philosophy   of  God   is   not   a  Christian   philosophy   since   it   is   the   perfect  work   of   reason   and   only  
raised  up  by  rational  criteria.    But  in  fact,  this  philosophy  requires  a  Christian  state  and  would  not  
be  possible  without  Christianity.”42   For  the  larger  purposes  of  the  article,  however,  Ricœur  uses  a  
certain   understanding   of   Thomism   as   representative   of   a   position   where   philosophy   is  
preparatory  of  and  foundation  for  theology.      
At   the   other   end   of   the   spectrum,   there   is   Barthianism   which   argues   that   revelation  
completely  escapes  any  approach  by  rational  means.     For  Barth,  as  Ricœur  underlines,  “there  is  
no  natural  theology,  no  Christian  philosophy.    There  is  only  the  relation  of  man  with  God  from  
the  initiative  of  God.”43   But  if  Ricœur  publicly  characterized  Thomism  as  positing  philosophy  as  
preparatory   and   foundational   for   theology,   even   as   he   privately   noted   its   affirmation   in   the  
priority   of   the  Word   of   God,   so   too,   he   publicly   characterized   Barth   as   rejecting   the   place   of  
natural  knowledge  even  as  he  privately  sought  to  uncover  resources  within  Calvinist  thought  for  
a  Christian  philosophy.44     Ricœur  seemed  to  be  interested,  in  particular,  in  the  notion  of  natural  
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theology  in  Calvin  as  a  way  into  thinking  about  the   issue  of  Christian  philosophy  and  whether  
there  can  be  a  philosopher  of  faith.        
In  any  case,  it  is  clear  that  Ricœur  uses  Thomism  and  Barthianism  as  foils  to  mark  out  a  
broad  spectrum  in  thought  over  the  possibility  of  Christian  philosophy.    Interestingly,  however,  
he   does   not   opt   for   one   over   the   other,   for   that   decision,   he   suggests,   finally   hinges   on   one’s  
beliefs  and  authorities  about  the  doctrine  of  sin.      If  one  believes  in  a  doctrine  of  radical  sin  that  
profoundly   deformed   humans,   then   humans   cannot   approach   or   re-­‐‑find   God   on   their   own  
powers.      If,  on   the  other  hand,   there   is  belief   in  a  certain  positivity  about  humans   that  remains  
unaltered  in  spite  of  sin,  then  human  powers  and  capabilities  can  do  some  work  in  preparing  for  
and  approaching  the  knowledge  of  God.    Rather  than  to  re-­‐‑open  that  debate  and  renew  age-­‐‑old  
divisions,  he  seeks  points  of  common  agreement  and  consensus.    Even  if  one  concedes  a  positive,  
apologetic  role  in  preparing  philosophy  for  the  truths  of  Christianity,  he  argues  that  it  also  must  
maintain  a  negative  function  that  critiques  the  pretensions  of  the  sciences  and  philosophies  that  
purport  to  be  an  ultimate  solution.45   Whatever  else  Christian  philosophy  might  mean,  it  is,  in  his  
words,  “a  science  of   limits.”46   Ricœur,   then,   seems   to   remain  uncommitted  as   to  what  positive  
sense,   if   any,   Christian   philosophy   can   hold,   and   instead,   he   opts   for   a   minimalistic  
understanding   to   which   Thomists   and   Barthians   alike   could   agree,   one   which   would   employ  
Socratic  irony  to  reveal  the  ignorance  of  human  wisdom,  or  at  least  to  deflate  totalitarian  forms  of  
thought.47      
Conclusion  
In   the   1930s   we   see   a   young   Ricœur   critically   reflecting   on   the   leading   philosophical  
movements  and  grappling  with  the  major  theological  developments  of  the  day  for  the  purposes  
of   engaging   the   intellectual   debate   in   Paris   at   the   time   on   the   status   and  meaning   of  Christian  
philosophy.  His  early  article,  his  unpublished  thesis,  and  private  notes  from  the  period  provide  
insight   into   the   broader   context   of   his   thought   during   his   formative   years   as   well   as   the   first  
tentative  steps  he  took  on  reflecting  about  the  relationship  between  philosophy  and  Christianity.    
What  emerges  during  this  early  period  is  a  picture  of  a  resolute  and  firm  Ricœur  regarding  how  
contemporary   philosophies   remain   incompatible   with   Christian   faith   as   well   as   the   possible  
import   of   Christian   philosophy   to   critique   and   deflate   precisely   the   totalitarian   claims   of   such  
approaches.      While   Ricœur   is   entirely   clear   and   just   in   both   his   critique   of   the   reflective  
philosophies   of   his   day   and  his   suggestion   for  Christian  philosophy   to   set   proper   limits,  what  
remains   murkier,   at   least   at   this   stage,   is   whether   there   is   a   positive   vision   for   Christian  
philosophy  in  his  thought.    His  reflections  on  the  matter,  however,  were  not  merely  an  occasional  
work  or  a  passing  period  in  his  thought,  but  rather  it  was  an  issue  to  which  he  would  turn  time  
and   again   throughout   his   career   with   each   development   becoming   ever   more   complex   and  
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